In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle. Although the same cost functions as well as the coefficient functions of the state dynamics are shared among the agents within each population, they can be different population by population. We study the mean field limit for the three different situations; (i) every agent is non-cooperative; (ii) the agents within each population are cooperative; and (iii) the agents in some populations are cooperative but those in the other populations are not. We provide several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium for each of these cases. Furthermore, under appropriate conditions, we show that the mean field solution to each of these problems actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but finite number of agents.
Introduction
In pioneering works of Lasry & Lions [26, 27, 28] and Huang, Malhame & Caines [22] , the two groups of researchers independently proposed a powerful technique to produce an approximate Nash equilibrium for stochastic differential games among a large number of agents with symmetric interactions. Importantly, each agent is assumed to be affected by the states of the other agents only through their empirical distribution. In the large population limit, the problem is shown to result in two highly coupled nonlinear partial differential equations (PDEs), the one is of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman type, which takes care of the optimization problem, while the other is of the Kolmogorov type guaranteeing the consistent time evolution of the distribution of the individual states of the agents. The greatest benefit of the mean-field game approach is to render notoriously intractable problems of stochastic differential games among many agents into simpler stochastic optimal control problems. For details of the analytical approach and its various applications, one may consult the monographs by Bensoussan, Frehse & Yam [2] , Gomes, Nurbekyan & Pimentel [20] , Gomes, Pimentel & Voskanyan [21] and also Kolokoltsov & Malafeyev [24] . * All the contents expressed in this research are solely those of the author and do not represent any views or opinions of any institutions. The author is not responsible or liable in any manner for any losses and/or damages caused by the use of any contents in this research. † Quantitative Finance Course, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
In a series of works [7, 8, 9] , Carmona & Delarue developed a probabilistic approach to these problems, where forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov type instead of PDEs were shown to be the relevant objects for investigation. In particular, they provided the sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for mean field games with the cost functions of quadratic growth in [8] . In the case of cooperative agents who adopt the common feedback control function, they showed in [9] that the large population limit results in the optimization problem with respect to a controlled McKean-Vlasov SDE. Using the notion of so-called L-derivative, which is a type of differential for functions defined on the space of probability measures, they solved the problem by a new class of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type. A probabilistic but weak formulation of the mean-field games was studied in Carmona & Lacker [12] and, in particular, in Carmona, Delarue & Lacker [13] in the presence of common noise. The details of probabilistic approaches, concrete examples, and many references for various applications are available in the recent two volumes of monograph [10, 11] .
In this work, we are interested in mean field games and mean field type control problems in the presence of multiple populations. Here, the same cost functions as well as the coefficient functions of the state dynamics are shared among the agents within each population, but they can be different population by population. Mean field games with multiple populations arise naturally in most of the practical applications, and were already considered in the first original work of [22] . Lachapelle & Wolfram [25] modeled a congestion problem of pedestrian crowds, and Achdou, Bardi & Cirant [1] studied the issue of urban settlements and residential choice using the mean-field game representation. Feleqi [17] and Cirant [14] dealt with ergodic mean field games of multiple populations under different boundary conditions. Recently, Bensoussan, Huang & Lauriere have considered a new type of problem in [3] , where the agents within each population are cooperative but compete with those in the other populations. They gave necessary conditions for equilibrium in terms of master equations. Note that, in all of these existing works, the analytic approach based on coupled nonlinear PDEs has been adopted.
In the current paper, differently from the existing works, we have adopted the probabilistic approach and closely followed the procedures developed in [8, 9] . In addition to the mean field games of multiple populations, we have studied the situation where the agents in each population are cooperative as in [3] , and yet another situation which is a mixture of the first two cases: the agents in some populations are cooperative within their own but those in the other populations are not. The presence of multiple populations induces a system of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type. Although it is a coupled system of FBSDEs due to the interactions among different populations, the couplings appear only through the mean field interactions i.e., the distribution of the state of the representative agent of each population. This feature allows us to solve a matching problem corresponding to the state of equilibrium by Schauder's fixed point theorem in a quite similar manner to [8] . In each of the three cases mentioned above, we have found several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, in particular the one which allows the cost functions of quadratic growth both in the state variable as well as in its distribution so that it is applicable to some of the popular linear quadratic problems. Moreover, we have investigated the quantitative relationships between the mean field problems discussed above and those with finite agents. In particular, under additional assumptions, we have proved that each mean field solution actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but finite number of agents. It highlights some interesting differences between the game where all the agents are non-cooperative and the one where the agents are cooperative in some populations.
The organization of the paper is as follows: after explaining notations in Section 2, we study the mean field problems in the first half of the paper; in Section 3 (i) the case of non-cooperative agents, in Section 4 (ii) the case where the agents are cooperative within each population, and in Section 5 (iii) the agents in some populations are cooperative but those in the other populations are not. In the second half of the paper, we investigate the corresponding problem with finite number of agents; we treats in Section 6 the case (i), in Section 7 the case (ii), and finally in Section 8 we treats the case (iii). Although we set the number of populations to two in the main analysis, this is just for notational convenience. We shall see that the analysis can be easily generalized to any finite number of populations. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.
Notations
Throughout the paper, we work on some complete probability space (Ω, F, P) equipped with a right-continuous and complete filtration F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] supporting two independent d-dimensional standard Brownian motions
F is a complete and right-continuous filtration generated by (ξ i , W i ). Here, T > 0 is a given terminal time. To lighten the notation, unless otherwise stated, we use indices i and j specifically to represent an element in {1, 2}, and we always suppose that j = i when they appear in the same expression. Moreover, we use the symbol C to represent a general nonnegative constant which may change line by line. When we want to emphasize that C depends only on some specific variables, say a and b, we use the symbol C(a, b). We let || · || 2 denote the L 2 (Ω, F, P; R d )-norm. We use the following notations for frequently encountered spaces: • S 2 is the set of R d -valued continuous processes X satisfying
• S ∞ is the set of R d -valued essentially bounded continuous processes X satisfying
• H 2 is the set of R d×d -valued progressively measurable processes Z satisfying
• L(X) denotes the law of a random variable X.
We always assign P p (R d ) with (p ≥ 1) the p-Wasserstein distance W p , which makes the space P p (R d ) a complete separable metric space. As an important property, for any µ, ν ∈ P p (R d ), we have
For more details, see Chapter 5 in [10] or Chapter 3 in [5] .
Mean Field Games with Multiple Populations
In this section, we consider a mean-field limit of a game among a large number of non-cooperative agents in the presence of two populations. Here, each agent competes with all the other agents but shares the common cost functions as well as coefficient functions of the state dynamics within each population. As we shall see, extending to the general situation with finite number of populations is straightforward.
Definition of the Mean Field Problem
Before specifying detailed assumptions, let us formulate the problem of finding an equilibrium in the limiting framework. It proceeds in the following three steps. (i) Fix any two deterministic flows of probability measures (µ i = (µ i t ) t∈[0,T ] ) i∈{1,2} given on R d . (ii) Solve the two optimal control problems inf
where ∂ (x,α) f i denotes the gradient in the joint variables (x, α). f i also satisfies the λ-convexity:
Moreover, for any (t,
x, µ, ν, α) and
For any x ∈ R d , the functions
are continuous in W 2 -distance. Moreover, the growth conditions
are satisfied.
We first consider the optimal control problem (3.1) for given deterministic flows of probability measures. The corresponding Hamiltonian for each population
Since σ i is independent of the control parameter, the minimizerα i (t, x, µ, ν, y) of the Hamiltonian H i can also be defined by a reduced Hamiltonian H (r) i :
x, µ, ν, α). The following result regarding the regularity ofα i is a straightforward extension of Lemma 2.1 [8] .
There exist constants C depending only on (L, λ) and C ′ depending additionally on K such that, for any t
Proof. To lighten the notation, let us write ρ = (µ, ν)
x, ρ, y, α) is strictly convex and once continuously differentiable,α i (t, x, ρ, y) is given by the unique solution to the variational inequality:
By strict convexity, the measurability is a consequence of the gradient descent algorithm (Lemma 3.3 [10] ). With an arbitrary point β i ∈ A i , the λ-convexity implies that
x, ρ, y). Hence we have
This gives the first growth condition. Next, withα i :=α(t, x, ρ, y) andα ′ i :=α t (t, x ′ , ρ, y ′ ), the optimality condition implies
This inequality, together with the λ-convexity, gives
x ′ , ρ,α i )| . This proves the Lipschitz continuity in (x, y). The continuity with respect to the measure arguments follows exactly in the same way.
For given flows µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )), the adjoint equation of the optimal control problem (3.1) for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 is given by
). Although two MKV-type FBSDEs are now coupled, their interactions appear only through the laws of the two populations. Thanks to this property, we can still apply a similar strategy developed by Carmona & Delarue [8, 7] . A crucial tool to prove the existence of an equilibrium is the Schauder's fixed point theorem [32] generalized by Tychonoff [35] 1 . The following form is taken from Theorem 4.32 in [10] . In this subsection, we prove the existence of a solution to the system of FBSDEs (3.19) under additional assumptions.
Here is the main result of this subsection. Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b), the system of FBSDEs (3.19) (and hence the matching problem (3.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. With slight abuse of notation, we let ( ] denote the solution to the FB-SDE (3.7) for a given flows ρ := (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 and the initial condition X i,ρ 0 = ξ i . By Theorem 3.1, we can define a map:
In the following, we are going to check the conditions necessary for the application of Schauder FPT to this map. As a linear vector space V in the FPT, we use the product space C([0, T ]; M 1 f (R d )) 2 equipped with the supremum of the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm:
where Lip 1 (R d ) is the set of 1-Lipschitz continuous functions on R d . Importantly, the norm || · || KR * is known to coincide with the 1-Wasserstein distance W 1 on P 1 (R d ) (Corollary 5.4 in [10] ). Of course, the reason to use a space of signed measures is to make it linear. From (3.6) with (β i = 0 A i ), it is immediate to see that |α i (t, 0, ρ, 0)| ≤ C(λ, Λ). Hence, by using the estimate (3.18) 
This inequality guarantees the uniform square integrability. In fact, the following estimate holds uniformly in ρ with any a ≥ 1; 2 E sup
Since the relation will be used repeatedly in the following, let us explain it here. For any D ∈ F 2 See p. 259 in [10] .
and ǫ > 0, we have, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
In the last inequality, we have maximized in ǫ. Here, C depends on ||ξ i || 2 but not on ρ. We also have
The above estimate suggests us to restrict the map Φ to the following domain:
which is a closed and convex subset of
Choosing C sufficiently large, we can make Φ a self-map on E. By the estimate (3.22) and Corollary 5.6 in [10] , there exists a compact subset
Finally, by Lemma 3.2 and also by the continuity of coefficients in the measure arguments in
Note that, by Theorem 5.5 in [10] , when ρ converge with respect to the norm || · || in (3.20) under the restriction to the domain E, ρ actually converges in W 2 -distance. This proves the continuity of the map Φ. Now the existence of a fixed point (not necessarily unique) of the map Φ is guaranteed by Schauder FPT, which provides a solution to the system of FBSDEs (3.19).
MFG equilibrium for small T or small coupling
In order to allow the quadratic cost functions relevant for popular Linear-Quadratic problems, we want to relax Assumption (MFG-b). This is exactly what Carmona & Delarue have done in [8] for single population. Although we can follow the same route, it requires much stronger assumptions than (MFG-a). Unfortunately, the conditions required in [8] preclude most of the interesting interactions among different populations through their state dynamics. In this work, in order to allow flexible interactions among populations and also to be complementary to the result in [8] , we focus on the problems with small T . Requiring small T is a reasonable trade-off for quadratic interactions by considering the fact that, even for a deterministic LQ-problem, the relevant Riccati equation may diverge within a finite time. After the analysis for small T , we provide another solution which allows general T but requires the couplings between FSDE and BSDE are small enough.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption (MFG-a), there exists some positive constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, the system of FBSDEs (3.19) (and hence the matching problem (3.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. For any n ∈ N and µ ∈ P 2 (R d ), let us define φ n • µ as a push-forward of µ by the map
. In other words, for any random variable X with L(X) = µ, the law of
Using this map, we introduce a sequence of approximated functions
, the minimizer given as a solution to the variational inequality (3.5) satisfiesα
whereα i is the minimizer of the original Hamiltonian H i . The regularization for b i,2 is done solely to obtain the simple expression (3.23) for the minimizer.
The new coefficient functions (b n i , σ n i , f n i , g n i ) clearly satisfy (MFG-a,b) for each n. Thus Theorem 3.3 guarantees that there exists a solution to the following system of FBSDEs of MKVtype with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j = i:
uniformly in n. Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ], it is easy to check that
with ξ := (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ). Therefore, there exists a constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any
uniformly in n.
Let us assume T ≤ c in the remainder. From (3.26), we can show straightforwardly that
Hence, combined with the equicontinuity, we conclude that (L(X 1,n t ) t∈[0,T ] , L(X 2,n t ) t∈[0,T ] ) n≥1 is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 . Therefore, there exists some (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 such that, upon extracting some subsequence (still denoted by n),
Thus, by making λ −1 ||b i,2 || ∞ small enough for a given T , we obtain the same estimate (3.26) . The remaining procedures for the proof are exactly the same as in Theorem 3.4. Remark 3.3. As one can see, there is no difficulty to generalize all the analyses in Section 3 for any finite number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It results in a search for a fixed point in the map
) m , which can be done in the same way.
Games among Cooperative Populations
In this section, we try to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium between two competing populations within each of which the agents share the same cost functions as well as the coefficient functions of the state dynamics. The difference from the situation studied in Section 3 is that the agents within each population now cooperate by using the common feedback strategy, say, under the command of a central planner. This results in a control problem of McKean-Vlasov type in the large population limit. See Chapter 6 in [10] to understand the details how the large population limit of cooperative agents induces a control problem of MKV type. The current problem has been discussed in Section 3 in Bensoussan et.al. [3] in the name Nash Mean Field Type Control Problem, where the necessary conditions of the optimality are provided in the form of a master equation. In this section, we adopt the probabilistic approach developed in Carmona & Delarue (2015) [9] for single population, and then provide several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Definition of Nash Mean Field Type Control Problem
(iii) Find a pair of probability flows (µ 1 , µ 2 ) as a solution to the matching problem:
where (X i,µ j ) i∈{1,2},j =i are the solutions to the optimal control problems in (ii).
Optimization for given flows of probability measures
In this subsection, we consider the step (ii) in the above formulation. Before giving the set of main assumptions, let us mention the notion of differentiability for functions defined on the space of probability measures. We adopt the notion of L-differentiability used in [9] , which was first introduced by Lions in his lecture at the College de France (see the lecture notes summarized in [6] ), where the differentiation is based on the lifting of functions
with Ω being a Polish space and P an atomless probability measure.
By Proposition 5.24 [10] , if u is L-differentiable at µ 0 in the sense of Definition 4.1, then u is differentiable at any X ′ 0 with L(X ′ 0 ) = µ 0 and the law of the pair (X ′ 0 , D u(X ′ 0 )) is independent of the choice of the random variable X ′ 0 . Thus the L-derivative may be denoted by
according to the definition, that: [6] and Chapter 5 in [10] . We now give the main assumptions in this section: 3 
(A3) For any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ′ ∈ R d , µ, µ ′ , ν ∈ P 2 (R d ) and α, α ′ ∈ A i , the functions f i and g i satisfy the quadratic growth conditions
and the local Lipschitz continuity
(A4) The functions f i and g i are once continuously differentiable in (x, α) and x respectively, and their derivatives are L-Lipschitz continuous with respect to (x, α, µ) and (x, µ) i.e.
The derivatives also satisfy the growth condition
Moreover, the derivatives ∂ (x,α) f i and ∂ x g i are continuous also in ν with respect to the W 2 -distance. (A5) The functions f i and g i are L-differentiable with respect to the first measure argument µ and they satisfy that, for any t
as well as the following growth condition:
and any random variables X, X ′ with L(X) = µ, L(X ′ ) = µ ′ , the functions f i and g i satisfy the convexity relations:
Remark 4.1. By Lemma 3.3 in [9] , the Lipschitz continuity in (A5) above implies that we can modify ∂ µ f i (t, x, µ, ν, α)(·) and ∂ µ g i (x, µ, ν)(·) on a µ-negligible set in such a way that,
for any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ [0, T ] × R d × P 2 (R d ) 2 × A i . In the remainder of the work, we always use these Lipschitz continuous versions.
As before, we first consider the optimal control problem (4.1) for given deterministic flows of probability measures. The Hamiltonian for each population
x, µ, ν, y) ∈ A i are defined in the same way as (3.3) and (3.4) with the coefficients replaced by those given in the current section.
Proof. It can be shown exactly in the same way as Lemma 3.1.
The control problem (4.1) for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 with a given flow of probability measure µ j ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )), j = i is actually the special case studied in [9] and Section 6.4 in [10] . In fact, we have removed the control α i dependency from the diffusion coefficient σ i . 4 The relevant adjoint equations for the optimal control problem of MKV-type (4.1) are given by with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j = i: dX i which is a C(L, λ)-Lipschitz FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type. Note that due to Lemma 4.1,α i is Lipschitz continuous not only in (X i , Y i ) but also in L(X i ). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, it is important to notice that the Lipschitz constant is independent of the given flow µ j , j = i. Since Assumption (MFTC-a) satisfies every solvability condition used in [9] , we have the following results: 5 [9] , where the sufficiency is proved in a parallel way to Theorem 3.1, and the unique solvability is based on the continuation method developed by Peng & Wu (1999) [30] . 
4)
with some constant C depending only on L and λ.
Proof. This is a direct result of Lemma 5.6 in [9] . The Lipschitz constant can be read from the stability estimate used in the continuation method (Lemma 5.5 in [9] ), which is dependent only on the Lipschitz constant of the FBSDE.
Remark 4.2. . Note that, due to the uniqueness of the solution, we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
L(X i t )) P-a.s. Moreover, once again by Lemma 3.3 in [9] , for any µ ∈ P 2 (R d ), there exists a version R d ∋ x → u µ j i (t, x, µ) in L 2 (R d , µ) that is Lipschitz continuous with the same Lipschitz constant C used in (4.4) i.e., |u µ j
In the remainder, we always use this Lipschitz version and often adopt a simpler notation u i without the superscript µ j .
Making use of the Lipschitz continuity in Lemma 4.2, we can derive the stability relation. 
satisfy Assumption (MFTC-a). For given inputs ξ i , ξ ′,i ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ) and µ j , µ ′,j ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )), let us denote the corresponding solution to (4.3) by (X i tively. Then, there exists a constant C depending only on (L, λ) such that 
and, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Proof. It can be proved in the same way as Lemma 3.2. For small T ≤ c, where c is dependent only on (L, λ), using the inequality W 2 (L(X), L(Y )) 2 ≤ E|X − Y | 2 , one can show the stability relation (4.5) exactly in the same way as in the standard Lipschitz FBSDE of non-MKV type. For general T , we can connect the short-term estimate by the same technique adopted in the proof of Lemma 3.2. Here, we make use of the Lipschitz continuity in Lemma 4.2.
As for the growth conditions, we get, by the same arguments used to derive (3.18),
we have ||u i (t, X i t , L(X i t ))|| 2 ≤ C ||ξ i || 2 + sup t∈[0,T ] M 2 (µ j t ) + C ′ from (4.6). By the Lipschitz continuity in Remark 4.2 and the estimate in (4.6), we get
Using the Lipschitz continuity in Remark 4.2 once again, we get the desired estimate (4.7).
Nash MFTC equilibrium under additional boundedness
In preceding subsections, we have seen that, for given flows of probability measures µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )), the solution to each optimal control problem of (4.1) is characterized by the uniquely solvable FBSDE (4.3). It follows that finding a solution to a matching problem (4.2) is equivalent to find a solution to the coupled systems of FBSDEs of MKV-type:
. In this subsection, we prove the existence of a solution to the system of FBSDEs (4.9) under the additional assumption. 
Here is the main result of this subsection. Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions (MFTC-a,b), the system of FBSDEs (4.9) (and hence the matching problem (4.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. We let, with
) t∈[0,T ] denote the solution to the FBSDE (4.3) for a given flow µ j ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) j = i and the initial condition X i,µ j 0 = ξ i . By Theorem 4.1, we can define a map:
It is easy to see that the solvability of the system of FBSDEs with McKean-Vlasov type (4.9) is equivalent to the existence of a fixed point of the map Φ. As in Theorem 3.3, we equip the linear space C([0, T ]; M 1 f (R d )) 2 with the supremum of the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm (3.20) so that we can apply Schauder FPT (Theorem 3.2).
We start from studying a priori estimates. By the estimate in (3.6), we get
and hence |α i (t, 0, δ 0 , µ j t , 0)| ≤ λ −1 Λ + |0 A i | ≤ C(λ, Λ) uniformly in µ j . The estimate (4.8) then implies that E sup t∈[0,T ] |Y i,µ j t | 2 ≤ C 1 + ||ξ i || 2 2 with C independent of µ j . From the last part of the proof for Lemma 4.3, we get, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Therefore, just repeating the arguments used in the proof for Theorem 3.3, we can show that Φ is a self-map on a closed and convex subset E of C([0, T ];
, (4.10)
with some constant C and that Φ(E) is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 . The continuity of the map Φ can be shown by Lemma 4.3 just as in Theorem 3.3. Schauder FPT now guarantees the existence of a fixed point for map Φ, which then establishes the existence of solution to the system of FBSDEs (4.9).
Nash MFTC equilibrium for small T or small coupling
Here is the main result of this section. 2) ) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. As in the proof for Theorem 3.4, we use the push-forward φ n • µ of the measure µ ∈ P 2 (R d ) defined by the map R d ∋ x → nx max(M 2 (µ), n)
. For eacn n ∈ N, we introduce the approximated coefficient functions by
It is obvious to see that the approximated coefficients (b n i , σ n i , f n i , g n i ) satisfy every condition in Assumptions (MFTC-a,b) . Moreover, the minimizerα n i of H n i is given bŷ
whereα i is the minimizer of the original Hamiltonian. The regularization for b i,2 is done solely to obtain the simple expression forα n i as above. By Theorem 4.2, for eacn n ∈ N, there exists a solution (X i,n t , Y i,n t , Z i,n t ) t∈[0,T ] , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 to the system of FBSDEs (4.9) with the approximated coefficient functions (b n i , σ n i , f n i , g n i ) 1≤i≤2 . By the estimate (4.7), there exist constants C depending only on (L, λ) and C ′ depending additionally on K such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], |Y i,n t | ≤ C ||ξ i || 2 + |X i,n t | + sup s∈[0,T ] M 2 (L(X j,n s )) + C ′ , P-a.s. uniformly in n. Lemma 4.1 then implies thatα n i (t) :=α n i (t, X i,n t , L(X i,n t ), L(X j,n t ), Y i,n t ) satisfies |α n i (t)| ≤ C ||ξ i || 2 + |X i,n t | + M 2 (L(X i,n t )) + sup s∈[0,T ] M 2 (L(X j,n s )) + C ′ . Thus, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
where C ′ now depends also on ||ξ|| 2 . Therefore there exists some constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, As in Section 3, it is possible to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for a given T with quadratic cost functions by making the coupling between FSDE and BSDE small enough. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) and a given T , the system of FBSDEs (4.9) (and hence he matching problem (4.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ) if λ −1 ||b i,2 || ∞ , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 are small enough.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the term involving sup t∈[0,T ] M 2 (L(X j,n s )) 2 in (4.11) is proportional to λ −1 ||b i,2 || ∞ . Hence, if we make this factor small enough, we obtains the estimate (4.12) for a given T . The remaining arguments are the same as in the proof for Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.3.
There is no difficulty to generalize all the analyses in Section 4 for handling any finite number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Games among Cooperative and non-Cooperative Populations
As a natural extension of Sections 3 and 4, we now study a Nash equilibrium with two populations, where the agents in the first population (P-1) cooperate by adopting the same feedback strategy while each agent in the second population (P-2) competes with every other agent. As before, we assume that the agents in each population share the same cost functions as well as the coefficient functions of their state dynamics. Let us call the large population limit of this problem as Nash MFTC-MFG Problem.
One of the motives to study this problem is to treat a situation, for example, where a large number of oil producers are competing to maximize their profits while a part of them are members of a certain association, such as OPEC, cooperating within the group to maintain a favorable level of oil price. Since the analysis can be generalized to any finite number of populations, it may have a wide scope of application.
Definition of Nash MFTC-MFG problem
We formulate the problem in the following way. (i) Fix any two deterministic flows of probability measures (µ i = (µ i t ) t∈[0,T ] ) i∈{1,2} given on R d . (ii) Solve the two optimal control problems inf
second population (P-2) are given by (MFG-a). We have already learned from Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 that the solution to each of the optimal control problems in (5.1) for given deterministic flows µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) is characterized by the uniquely solvable FBSDEs, dX 1 with X 2 0 = ξ 2 and Y 2 T = ∂ x g 2 (X 2 T , L(X 2 T ), L(X 1 T )). In this section, our goal is to prove the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions (MFTC-a,b) for the coefficients (b 1 , σ 1 , f 1 , g 1 ) and Assumptions (MFG-a,b) for the coefficients (b 2 , σ 2 , f 2 , g 2 ), the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence the matching problem (5.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. We let (X 1,
) t∈[0,T ] denote the solutions to the FBSDE (5.3) and (5.4) respectively for given flows of probability measures (µ 1 , µ 2 ). By defining the map Φ as
the claim is proved once we find a fixed point of the map Φ.
It is the direct result of Theorem 4.2 for (P-1) and Theorem 3.3 for (P-2) that there exists a constant C independent of µ 1 and µ 2 such that, for any t, s ∈ [0, T ],
Thus we can show that, for the same form of closed and convex subset E of C([0, T ]; M 1 f (R d )) 2 in (4.10) with sufficiently large C, that Φ maps E into itself and also that Φ(E) is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 . The continuity of the map Φ can be shown by Lemmas 4.3 and 3.2 just as in Theorems 4.2 and 3.3. By Schauder FPT, the claim is proved.
MFTC-MFG equilibrium for small T or small coupling
We now give the main result of Section 5.
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) for the coefficients (b 1 , σ 1 , f 1 , g 1 ) and Assumption (MFG-a) for the coefficients (b 2 , σ 2 , f 2 , g 2 ), there exists some positive constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence matching problem (5.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; R d ).
Proof. Let us introduce the approximated functions (b n 1 , σ n 1 , f n 1 , g n 1 ) n≥1 as in Theorem 4.3 and also (b n 2 , σ n 2 , f n 2 , g n 2 ) n≥1 as in Theorem 3.4, which satisfy Assumptions (MFTC-a,b) and Assumptions (MFG-a,b) for each n, respectively. Theorem 5.1 then guarantees that there exists a solution to the system of FBSDEs (5.5) with the approximated functions (b n i , σ n i , f n i , g n i ) 1≤i≤2 for each n. We let (X i,n t , Y i,n t , Z i,n t ) t∈[0,T ] , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 denote the corresponding solution. Since inequalities (4.11) and (3.25) still hold, we can show that there exist constants C depending only on (L, λ) and C ′ depending additionally on K such that,
Hence we get, by Gronwall's inequality, that
Therefore there exists a positive constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c,
Using the linear growth property ofα n i in |X i,n t |, we can show that (L(X 1,n t ) t∈[0,T ] , L(X 2,n t ) t∈[0,T ] ) n≥1 is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 . The remaining arguments proceed in exactly the same way as in the proofs for Theorems 4.3 and 3.4. Theorem 5.3. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) for the coefficients (b 1 , σ 1 , f 1 , g 1 ) and Assumption (MFG-a) for the coefficients (b 2 , σ 2 , f 2 , g 2 ) and a given T , the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence matching problem (5.2)) is solvable for any ξ 1 ,
Proof. The claim can be proved in a completely parallel way to Theorems 3.5 and 4.4.
Remark 5.1. As in Sections 3 and 4, the analysis can be easily extended for the situation with any finite number of cooperative and non-cooperative populations.
Approximate Equilibrium for MFG with Finite Agents
In the remaining sections, we investigate quantitative relationships between the solutions to the mean field games obtained in the previous three sections and those to their associated games with finite number of agents. We make use of the techniques developed in [34, 4, 6, 8, 9] and in particular Chapter 6 in [11] with appropriate generalizations to fit our situation. First, in this section, we shall study the finite agent problem associated with the multi-population mean field game solved in Section 3. Throughout the section, we assume that the conditions used either in Theorem 3.4 or Theorem 3.5 are satisfied. We let (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 denote a solution to the matching problem (3.2).
Convergence of approximate optimal controls
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we suppose that there are N i agents who are labeled by p. Let us first introduce N i independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of the state process in the mean field setup:
Brownian motions, which are also independent from (ξ i,p ) 1≤p≤N i . Moreover, they are assumed to be independent from those in the other population. In other words, all of the set (ξ i,p , W i,p ) 1≤p≤N i ,1≤i≤2 are assumed to be independent. u i is the decoupling field given in Theorem 3.1 associated with the equilibrium flows of probability measures (µ i , µ j ).α i is the minimizer of the Hamiltonian for the population i defined in (3.4) . By construction, (X i,p ) 1≤p≤N i are i.i.d. processes satisfying L(X i,p t ) = µ i t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. We denote the empirical distribution for (X i,p ) 1≤p≤N i by
In the remainder, the complete probability space (Ω, F, P) is enlarged accordingly to support (ξ i,p , W i,p ) 1≤p≤N i ,1≤i≤2 and the filtration F is assumed to be generated by (ξ i,p , W i,p ) 1≤p≤N i ,1≤i≤2 with complete and right-continuous augmentation. 
Furthermore, when µ i 0 ∈ P r (R d ) with r > 4, we have an explicit estimate
Proof. When µ i 0 ∈ P r (R d ), ∀r ≥ 2, it is standard to check
with some C independent of N i thanks to the linear growth of the coefficients in (6.1). Then, the last claim is the direct result of Theorem 5.8 and Remark 5.9 in [10] .
As for the first claim, (5.19) in [10] implies
for each t. In order to prove the uniform convergence in t 6 , it suffices to show that there exists a compact set K ⊂ C([0, T ]; R) such that
In fact, if this is the case, every subsequence has a uniformly convergent subsequence, all of which converge to 0 due to the pointwise convergence in (6.2). Hence, the whole sequence must uniformly converges to 0. The boundedness can be checked by
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ t, s ≤ T ,
which implies the equicontinuity. Arzela-Ascoli theorem guarantees the desired compactness. 
for any t ∈ [0, T ], µ ′ , µ, ν ′ , ν ∈ P 2 (R d ), and b i,1 , b i,2 as well as σ i,1 are independent of the measure arguments.
(A2) f i and g i are local Lipschitz continuous with respect to the measure arguments i.e., there exists some constant K for any t
For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j = i, 1 ≤ p ≤ N i , let us consider the following state dynamics.
The associated cost functional
Taking the average and the applying Gronwall's inequality, we get sup
Using the above estimate and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, we get
By similar calculation, we see
Combining the same estimate for the jth population, we get from Gronwall's inequality that
Here, we have used ||α i,1 || 2 H 2 ≤ C and the result of Lemma 6.1. By the triangle inequality,
holds. Similarly, we have
From (6.5), (6.7), (6.8), (6.9) and (6.10), we get
By the estimate in Lemma 6.2, (6.6) and the fact that ||α i,1 || 2 H ≤ C, we see
For large N 1 and N 2 with C 2 j=1 ε N j ≤ λ, we get the desired result.
Remark 6.3. The above analysis can be generalized straightforwardly to the setup with any finite number of populations, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Approximate Equilibrium for MFTC with Finite Agents
In this section, we shall show how the solution to the Nash MFTC problem studied in Section 4 can provide an approximate Nash equilibrium among the two competing populations of finite agents who are cooperative within each population. In the last section dealing with the non-cooperative agents, the effect to the interactions from the agent deviating from the optimal strategy was shown to vanish in the large population limit. This does not happen in the current case, because all the agents in one population adopt the common strategy different from the optimal one. We shall see that this feature requires us more stringent assumptions to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Throughout the section, we assume that the conditions used either in Theorem 4.3 or Theorem 4.4 are satisfied. We let (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ C([0, T ]; P 2 (R d )) 2 denote a solution to the matching problem (4.2). Moreover, unless otherwise stated, we use the same notation in the last section.
Convergence of approximate optimal controls
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we first consider (N i ) i.i.d. copies of the sate process in the mean field setup
where u i is the function defined in Lemma 4.2 associated with the equilibrium flows of probability measures (µ i , µ j ). As in the last section, (ξ i,p , W i,p ) 1≤p≤N i ,1≤i≤2 are assumed to be independent with L(ξ i,p ) = µ i 0 . By construction, (X i,p ) 1≤p≤N i are i.i.d. processes satisfying L(X i,p t ) = µ i t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. µ i t denotes the empirical distribution of (X i,p t ) 1≤p≤N i . Lemma 7.1. Suppose that the conditions either for Theorem 4.3 or Theorem 4.4 are satisfied. Then, for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exists some sequence (ǫ N i ) N i ≥1 that tends to 0 as N i tends to ∞ and some constant C such that
Proof. It can be proved in the same way as Lemma 6.1.
Let us introduce the following assumptions. for any t ∈ [0, T ], ν ′ , ν ∈ P 2 (R d ), and b i,1 ,b i,1 , b i,2 , σ i,1 as well asσ i,1 are independent of the measure argument.
(A2) f i and g i are local Lipschitz continuous with respect to the second measure argument i.e., there exists some constant K for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R d , µ, ν ′ , ν ∈ P 2 (R d ) and α ∈ A i , such that |(f i , g i )(t, x, µ, ν ′ , α) − (f i , g i )(t, x, µ, ν, α)| ≤ K 1 + |x| + M 2 (µ) + M 2 (ν ′ ) + M 2 (ν) + |α| W 2 (ν ′ , ν) . Remark 7.1. Assumption (MFTC-FA-b) will be used in the last part where we prove the property of the approximate Nash equilibrium. Under this stringent assumption, the mutual interactions among the agents belonging to the different populations are induced only through the cost functions and can appear only in their control strategies.
As in the last section, we introduce for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j = i, 1 ≤ p ≤ N i the state dynamics dX i,p and E sup t∈[0,T ] |X i,p for any t ∈ [0, T ]. The cost functional for the ith population is now given by
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we give i.i.d. copies of the state process in the mean field setup:
dX i,p and the agents in the second population adopt, for any t ∈ [0, T ], β 2,q population, we get Now Lemma 8.2 gives the desired estimate.
(second step): Let us now prove the claim under (setup-2). By putting i = 2 and j = 1, all of the arguments in the proof for Theorem 6.1 work as they are. In fact, due to the independence of (b 2 , σ 2 ) from the second measure argument, some of the estimates become slightly simpler. In particular, (6.8) and (6.9) hold with (i = 2, j = 1). The estimate (6.10) is now given by E sup
without the term ε N 1 . The estimate for |J N 2 ,N 1 ,1 2 (β 2,1 ,α 2,(N 2 ) −1 ,α 1,(N 1 ) ) − J 1 2 (β 2,1 )| is given by exactly the same formula as in (third step) of the proof for Theorem 6.1 with (i = 2, j = 1). Now, combining the result in Lemma 8.2, we get the desired estimate.
Remark 8.2. We have investigated the approximate Nash equilibrium in the closed loop framework. The analysis for the open loop framework can be done in a quite similar manner as explained in Remark 6.2. Generalization to an arbitrary number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m can be done straightforwardly, but the direct interactions in the state processes must be carefully arranged. The empirical distribution of the states of the agents who are in a cooperative population must not appear in the coefficients of the state process of the agents in any other populations. The empirical distribution can appear only in the control strategies indirectly induced by the interactions in the cost functions. On the other hand, the distribution of the states of the agents who are in a noncooperative population can directly appear in the coefficients of the state processes of the agents in any populations.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this work, we have systematically investigated mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations for three different situations: (i) every agent is non-cooperative, (ii) the agents within each population are cooperative, and (iii) the agents in some populations are cooperative but not in the other populations. The relevant adjoint equations were shown to be given in terms of a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type. In each case, we have provided several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, in particular the one which allows the cost functions of quadratic growth both in the state variable as well as its distribution so that it is applicable to some of the popular setups of linear quadratic problems. In the second half of the paper, under additional assumptions, we have proved that each solution to the mean field problems solved in the first half of the paper actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but finite number of agents.
As future works, we may study similar problems by adopting HJB type approach using so-called quadratic growth BSDEs as in [10] , where the backward component directly represents the value function. Although we need the boundedness of the coefficients and the non-degeneracy for the diffusion function, the resultant boundedness of the solution to the BSDEs will make the analysis simpler. When each agent is subject to independent random Poisson measure, we may use the recent developments of the quadratic growth BSDEs with jumps such as in [29, 23, 18] . Finally, developing an efficient numerical method for mean field games and mean field type control problems remains as a very important issue. For a general problem, due to its infinite dimensionality, machine learning techniques (such as in [16] ) are promising candidates. If the problem can be approximated by a linear quadratic setup, its solution may help to accelerate the speed of convergence for the learning process in the spirit of the work [19] .
Finally, we can see that
